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A COMPARISON OF THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF SPINOZA AND HOBBS

IF ONE could believe that a philosophical system emanates full-fledged from the mind of a single thinker, as Athene from the head of Zeus, he might venture to decide the extent to which one philosopher is indebted to another for the elements of his system. But, in point of fact, the task of awarding credit where credit is due varies directly in magnitude with the quantity of literary remains of the age under investigation. For philosophies originate out of the vague and ill-defined thoughts of multitudes of individuals. When a Plato or a Hobbes ultimately gives clearly and distinctly a systematic and classic expression to what previously existed more as an attitude than a way of life, more as a mood and a feeling than as a logical and intellectual formulation, we quite properly give homage. But as our acquaintance with the environment giving birth to this expression becomes more detailed and intimate, the more keenly do we realize that our Plato or our Hobbes has succeeded in stating better, more clearly, more consistently and more forcibly what weaker minds strove to convey. Indeed, it seems that philosophers like inventors build upon the trials and errors of their predecessors and contemporaries.

Consequently, we shall not attempt to determine precisely how far Spinoza is indebted to Hobbes, although we know he read him thoroughly. Some critics are so

rash as to consider Spinoza no more than a disciple of Hobbes, while, on the other hand, Duff, who has produced one of the most complete and careful studies thus far made of Spinoza's political philosophy, contends that Spinoza follows St. Paul more than Hobbes, and states, "a deeper influence than that of Hobbes was exercised by Hobbes' master, Machiavelli."¹ Duff's study, together with Pollock's excellent comparison of Hobbes and Spinoza, furnishes us with a thorough contrast of their political philosophies.

Our interest here is primarily in their moral philosophies, but since politics is one application of ethics, we shall have to treat of their political views in so far as these throw light upon their moral programs.

A suggestive approach to a study of the differences and similarities in the ethics of Hobbes and Spinoza is found in their opinions regarding the function of the state. According to Hobbes, *one* motive prompts men to institute a state—*fear*. The state of nature is a condition of war. Each man seeks to realize his desires, to enhance his power, and in so doing conflicts with others bent upon a like object, and the liberty (*Jus Naturale*), which he has "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature"² and thus to appropriate the goods and services of other men is scant compensation for the dangers thus entailed. "In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of

¹ *Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy*, p. 6.

² *Leviathan* (Everyman Edition), Ch. 14, pp. 66.

all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”³

Fear prompts reason to devise a condition of peace. . . . “As long as this naturall Right of everyman to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be), of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavor Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre.* The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, *to seek Peace and follow it.* The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, *By all means we can, to defend our selves.*”⁴

The motive then for establishing the state is fear, and the end sought is individual self-preservation. If man could live an ideal life, it would be, for Hobbes, a state of absolute subjection of others and absence of impediments to the desires of self. The absolute ruler most nearly embodies this ideal, for he alone enjoys the services of others without obligation to repay in kind. The average citizen, however, endures the state as a necessary evil. He assisted in its origin and helps to sustain it in order to avoid the worst possible calamity, a relapse into the state of nature. The contract then which creates the state is a renunciation of certain liberties or rights in return for protection and the liberty to gratify other desires. Nor does Hobbes believe he contradicts himself when he insists that in the event of a conflict between individual judgment and that of the monarch, the former shall yield. The individual must yield, he insists, because originally he agreed to place the making of decisions in the hands of the state,

³ *Ibid.*, Ch. 13, p. 65.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. 14, p. 67.

and, further, should men follow their own opinions society would disintegrate, and revert once more to "a warre, as is of every man, against every man."

The function of the state, as Hobbes views it, is thus essentially negative. As against anarchy or absolutism man selects the lesser of two evils—absolutism. And the laws of nature, which Hobbes calls the precepts or general rules of Reason, he sums up in a negative statement of the Golden Rule: "Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe."⁵ Security is found in obeying the law, but a truly thoughtful and reasonable man must surely balance constantly in his mind the advantages of conformity to law as against a realization of his own desires.

Spinoza conceives the state otherwise. It is true there is a semblance of Hobbes in his account of its origin, for release from fear is one of the motives he mentions. But whereas Spinoza insists that at best fear is a poor motive, a passion in the individual, and a constant danger to the security of the state, Hobbes believes that life is never without fear,⁶ and "the terrour of some Power" is the permanent basis of the commonwealth.⁷ Hobbes, to be sure, realizes the advantages of co-operative endeavor, but for Spinoza mutual aid is the ultimate justification for social organizations and the indispensable means of realizing man's true happiness. Thus he writes in the *Theologico-Political Treatise*: "The formation of society serves not only for defensive purpose, but is also very useful, and, indeed, absolutely necessary, as rendering possible the division of labor. If men did not render mutual assistance to each other, no one would have either the skill or the time to provide for his own sustenance and preservation: for all men are not equally apt for all work, and no one

⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. 15, p. 82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch. 6, p. 30.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. 17.

would be capable of preparing all that he individually stood in need of. Strength and time, I repeat, would fail, if every one had in person to plough, to sow, to reap, to grind corn, to cook, to weave, to stitch, and perform the numerous functions required to keep life going; to say nothing of the arts and sciences which are also entirely necessary to the perfection and blessedness of human nature. We see that peoples living in uncivilized barbarism lead a wretched and almost animal life, and even they would not be able to acquire their few rude necessities without assisting one another to a certain extent.”⁸ And again, when discussing the foundations of the state: “Nevertheless, no one can doubt that it is much better for us to live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we said, they have men’s true good for their object. Moreover, everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did everything he liked, and reason’s claim lowered to a par with those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in the midst of enmity, hatred, anger and deceit, and who does not seek to avoid them as much as he can. When we reflect that men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most miserably, as we clearly proved in Chapter V, we shall plainly see that men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life should be no more conditioned by the force and desire of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body. This end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be guided in everything by reason

⁸ *Works* (Bohn Edition), Vol. I, p. 73.

(which nobody will dare openly to repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to all as they would be done by, and that they will defend their neighbour's rights as their own."⁹

Spinoza saw clearly wherein he differed from Hobbes, and he states in a note to Chapter 16 of the *Theologico-Political Treatise*: "Now reason (though Hobbes thinks otherwise) is always on the side of peace, which cannot be attained unless the general laws of the state be respected."¹⁰ And in Part IV of the *Ethics*, he writes, "Now, if men lived under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this his right (his natural right) without any injury to his neighbour."¹¹ That is, whereas Hobbes considers the desires and wants of men inevitably bring them into conflict, Spinoza insists that it is only passion, the irrational and ill-informed opinions of their wants, which lead men to disagree. The true needs of men are in harmony and are realizable most fully in society. The state, for Spinoza, as for Hobbes, is a necessary evil; but it is a necessary evil, according to Spinoza, only because and in so far as it must resort to means which are a poor substitute for rational behavior. "Wherefore, in order that men may live together in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from all actions which can injure their fellowmen. The way in which this end can be attained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions (IV., iv. Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV., vii. and III., XXXIX. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 202.

¹⁰ That is, of course, the laws of a democratic state.

¹¹ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37, note 2.

than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting injury themselves."¹²

The best state then would be one which governs rationally; that is, one which establishes laws enabling men to develop and expand the potentialities of their nature. Consequently Spinoza opposes an absolutism and favors a democracy. "In a democracy, irrational commands are still less feared: for it is impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it be a large one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover, the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational, and to bring men as far as possible under the control of reason, so that they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the whole fabric falls to ruin."¹³ As a necessary means to rational legislation, Spinoza pleads for the utmost freedom of thought and speech, distinguishing sharply between obedience to law and the expression of opinions regarding the wisdom of particular legislation.¹⁴ "No," he exclaims passionately, "the object of government is not to change men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to employ their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, anger, deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty."¹⁵

A difference in conception as to the function of the state carries with it a corresponding disagreement as to the nature and purpose of the individual. But here again, on

¹² *Ibid.*, IV, Prop. 37, note 2.

¹³ *Theologico-Political Treatise. Works*, Vol. I, p. 206.

¹⁴ See Ch. 20 of the *Theologico-Political Treatise*. A comparison of this chapter in Spinoza with chapter 29 in Hobbes' *Leviathan*, "Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLUTION of a Common-wealth," will reveal the gap separating the two men. Contrasting what Hobbes has to say about the reading of the ancient writers with this title page of Spinoza's treatise: "Wherein is set forth that freedom of thought and speech not only may, without prejudice to piety and the public peace, be granted; but also may not, without danger to piety and the public peace, be withheld."

¹⁵ *Theologico-Political Treatise. Works*, Vol. I, p. 259.

first reading, Spinoza seems to repeat Hobbes. Reason, says Hobbes, "is nothing but Reckoning."¹⁶ And it is no more than a reckoning of consequences in terms of personal self-preservation, enhancement of vital motion and increase in power. Spinoza seems essentially to repeat Hobbes when he writes, "it is the sovereign law and right of nature that each individual should endeavor to preserve itself as it is, without regard to anything but itself."¹⁷ And again, ". . . in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it."¹⁸

But it is no mere repetition of Hobbes, for Spinoza does not mean the same thing by reason, nor is his individual an insulated atom. Hobbes considers that reason recognizes little in common between men, nor does it seek to ascertain their mutual welfare. It serves rather to gratify the possessive impulses and to obtain individual advantage. When contrasting man with the bees and ants whose "Common good differeth not from the Private," Hobbes points out that "man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent."¹⁹ Spinoza, however, believes that reason frees man from an isolated and miserable condition and in operating according to notions common to all men, it contributes to their mutual welfare. The rational life unites man to man. In the state of nature man has a natural right to gratify any and all desires, but this state of nature is not something actually prior to and apart from a social medium. The state of nature is merely a condition of subjection to passion and ignorance. Natural right means no more than a natural tendency to act under certain

¹⁶ *Leviathan*, Ch. 5, p. 18.

¹⁷ *Theologico-Political Treatise. Works*, Vol. I, p. 200.

¹⁸ *Ethics*, III, Prop. 9, note.

¹⁹ *Leviathan*, Ch. 17, p. 88.

conditions. Consequently, to say, "the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire dictates, or to live according to desire," just as "the wise man has sovereign right to do all that reason dictates,"²⁰ is not to undermine sound morality; it is merely to say that if one lacks reason and is ruled by passion, he can act only in accordance with passion. Reason frees man from this hopeless state. It enables him neither to exploit another, nor to realize his desires at the expense of others—as it can very well do for Hobbes. As Spinoza conceives it, "men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature, and consequently for each individual man."²¹ Reason thus supplies us with a criterion by means of which we can select those activities which at once aid us and assist others. Reason breaks down man's isolation; Hobbes' individual remains forever apart from others. In short, that deplorable state which Spinoza calls passion, the bondage of man, from which reason frees him, is for Hobbes the permanent condition of man. Human reason may, according to Spinoza, succeed in inaugurating an era of good will. Life, for Hobbes, is always a pugilistic encounter, and the best reason can do is to substitute gloves, a referee, and Queensbury rules for bare fists and go it as you please until the first man drops.

This difference in ultimate purpose applies as well to their conceptions of self-preservation. For each self-preservation is an increase in power, and power is stimulation of vital activity. Pleasure and pain, Hobbes defines in terms of motion.²² But Spinoza will not object to describing emotions as modifications of Extension. He merely insists that we remember (what Hobbes denies) that vital motion and a thought activity are two aspects of one and

²⁰ *Theologico-Political Treatise*, Vol. I, p. 201.

²¹ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 35, demonstration.

²² *Leviathan*, Ch. 6.

the same thing.²³ Had Spinoza chosen to treat emotion in the language appropriate to the Attribute of Extension he would not have profoundly disagreed with these statements from Hobbes: "The Endeavor, when it is toward something which causes it, is called Appetite or Desire." "And when the Endeavor is fromward something, it is generally called Aversion."²⁴ It is only when we inquire of each, "What is the final goal of endeavor, the ultimate end of self-preservation?" that we receive profoundly different replies.

Hobbes denies outright the existence of a *Summum Bonum* and contends, "that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied."²⁵ "*Continuall successe* in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquility of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no more than without Sense."²⁶ "So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power; but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more."²⁷ Carried out logically, this means that might makes right. The strongest desire, in the sense of the most vigorous and permanent desire, is the right desire in the individual's soul, as the strongest arm is the morally justified arbitrator of relations between men. We

²³ *Ethics*, II, Prop. 7.

²⁴ *Leviathan*, Ch. 6, p. 23.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. II, p. 49.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch. 6, p. 30.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. II, pp. 49-50.

have observed above that the conflicts between men's interests necessitates the organization of the state; but the decrees of the state are right only because and only so long as the state can enforce its decisions. Hobbes calls upon no man to lay down his life for a lost cause. Self-preservation is the first and the last duty. "If a Monarch subdued by war, render himselfe Subject to the Victor; his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the Victor."²⁸ Right is the interest of the stronger. Such is the conclusion which Hobbes considers to be the dictates of reason.

Reason for Spinoza speaks a different tongue. We have already indicated that Spinoza considers natural law to be no more than a description of things as they are in the absence of organized relations between men. Natural right is not right in a moral sense. And when Spinoza states that "the law and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and for the most part live, forbids nothing but what no one wishes or is able to do and is not opposed to strifes, hatred, anger, treachery, or, in general, anything appetite suggests,"²⁹ he speaks not of what ought to be; he merely describes a fact. The laws of nature and natural rights are descriptions of conditions, not suggested programs for action. Spinoza's insistence upon viewing men's vices and imperfections dispassionately and scientifically should not blind us to his acceptance of right as an ideal, and as a valid, objective moral standard. Right is the reasonable. The right act involves in it more perfection and more power than a wrong act. In his study of human nature he means, "by 'good' that which we certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by 'bad,' that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the said type. Again, we

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Ch. 21, p. 117.

²⁹ *Political Treatise. Works*, Vol. I, p. 294.

shall say that men are more perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type."⁸⁰

We have seen that Spinoza conceives the rational life as a social life, the life of co-operative endeavor and harmonious relations with one's fellows. Consequently the impulse towards self-preservation which, in Hobbes' opinion, sanctions and renders inevitable a personal aggrandisement and increase in power, becomes in Spinoza's ethics social action and the chief principle of social solidarity. If we act upon Hobbes' convictions we shall never transcend the selfish act; but if we heed Spinoza, in passing from passion to active emotion, we shall transform selfishness into **altruistic action**.

Indeed, as Spinoza conceives it, true happiness is found only when men act in accordance with rational endeavor. When he points the way to human freedom he insists, as the first condition of emancipation from passion, that we transform a passion into an active emotion, and this we may do by securing a clear and distinct idea of it. Thus, he writes in the note to Proposition 4 of Part V of the *Ethics*: "To attain this result, therefore (freedom from passion), we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion, in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it will come to pass, not only that love, hatred, etc., will be destroyed (V. ii), but also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV., lxi). For it must be especially remarked, that the appe-

⁸⁰ *Ethics*, IV, Preface.

tite through which a man is said to be active, and through which he is said to be passive is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellowmen to live after his own fashion (III., xxxi. note); in a man, who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by the dictates of reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety (IV. xxxvii. note i. and second proof). In like manner, all appetites or desires are only passions, in so far as they spring from inadequate ideas; the same results are accredited to virtue, when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires, whereby we are determined to any given action, may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV. lix)."⁸¹

Consequently, the impulse for self-preservation, which, in Hobbes' system, forever condemns the individual to "a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death," develops quite otherwise for Spinoza. On the plane of Imaginative Knowledge and of passion alone does it oppose self-interest to the good of others. When the impulse expands into active emotion and Rational Knowledge it leads to co-operative relations between men. Says Spinoza: "There are then many things, outside ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals of entirely

⁸¹ We should remember, however, that for Spinoza there is no distinction in kind between reason and passion. The idea of the good for him is merely the conscious aspect of an activity. When the activity gets its explanation from external objects acting upon the individual, it is passion. When it is self-directive activity it is active emotion. The increase in knowledge is not so much a cause for the transition from passion to active emotion as a description of the fact. In other words, Spinoza's doctrine of the necessary character of the universe robs the individual of genuine initiative and fundamentally renders inexplicable how on one's own account he can win freedom.

the same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly.

"Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man—nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for by men, than that all should in all points agree, that the minds and bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single body, and that all should, with one consent as far as they are able, endeavor to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all. Hence men, who are governed by reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason—desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, and consequently, are just, faithful, and honorable in their conduct."³²

Spinoza's impulse of self-preservation leads men differently from the way Hobbes describes not merely because, in Spinoza's ethics, egoism, as the last quotation might suggest, is more farseeing than in Hobbes. In a measure such is the case. But Spinoza literally believes we gain our life by losing it. In so far as we live the life of reason we identify ourselves with God and thereby with what is permanent and common in all men. The distinctions which mark off man from man disappear, and as "the bases of reason are the notions which answer to things common to all,"³³ so the essence of individuality that remain when passion broadens out into active emotion is the force which "follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature."³⁴ "Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God."³⁵

³² *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 18, note.

³³ *Ethics*, II, Prop. 44, Coroll. 2, demonstration.

³⁴ *Ethics*, II, Prop. 45, note.

³⁵ *Ethics*, V, Prop. 29, note.

And so the impulse of self-preservation properly leads man into the rational life. Only as a rational being does he increase his power and arrive at true independence. "Nay, inasmuch as human power is to be reckoned less by physical vigor than by mental strength, it follows that those men are most independent whose reason is strongest, and who are most guided thereby. And so I am altogether for calling a man free, as he is led by reason; because so far he is determined to action by such causes, as can be adequately understood by his unassisted nature, although by these causes he be necessarily determined to action."⁸⁶

Thus right, for Spinoza, is no moral justification of things as they are, although it does imply an acquiescence of spirit. But the acquiescence of spirit which the free man possesses is a loyalty to an ideal which, as it were, transcends the environment in which he finds himself. He does not take advantage of the weaknesses of others, nor does he submit to the false valuations which chance to control the social environment in which he lives. He renders back "love or kindness for other men's hatred, anger, contempt."⁸⁷ Courteously and kindly he tries to lead others by reason,⁸⁸ and should he fail, he accepts the situation stoically, conscious of its eternal necessity, and "endeavors, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good and to go on his way rejoicing."⁸⁹

We may conclude, then, that Spinoza and Hobbes speak quite differently regarding the function of the state, regarding the ideal social order, the nature and destiny of the individual, the place of reason in human life, and in the character and ultimate purpose of the impulse for self-preservation. Their relation is not that of master and disciple. If we may take an illustration from industrial life,

⁸⁶ *Political Treatise. Works*, Vol. I, p. 295.

⁸⁷ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 46.

⁸⁸ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 37.

⁸⁹ *Ethics*, IV, Prop. 73, note.

we might say that Spinoza's relation to Hobbes is that of a manufacturer to the producer of his raw materials. Hobbes supplies the raw produce, Spinoza makes it over into a new and original article.

Their disagreements find an explanation in the metaphysical backgrounds of the two men. Hobbes is a mechanical empiricist, Spinoza is a rationalist. Spinoza cannot admit that the individual is other than an expression of a deeper and more fundamental reality. Each individual, as he sees it, testifies in a unique way to the boundless and infinite possibilities of Substance; but Substance is an immanent Energy. Man is Substance and Substance is man. In God and in God alone man lives and moves and has his being. Consequently, in identifying his personal ends with the highest good of his fellows, man approaches to the supreme ethical ideal, "a knowledge of the union existing between the mind and the whole of nature."⁴⁰ Hence, the fragmentary and short-sighted character, as Spinoza must see it, of Hobbes' individualism. It is true only as a description of man's condition of bondage; and it has value only as it enables him to escape into the life of reason. Its truth is merely the truth of Imaginative Knowledge. Hence, it lacks ultimate validity both as a description of human relations as they *really* are, and as a program for attaining to a state of blessedness.

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⁴⁰ *Improvement of the Understanding. Works*, Vol. II, p. 6.